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Abstract. While the ability to express routing policies in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) has been 
well-studied, unfortunately, the ability to enforce these policies has not been. The core challenge is that if 
we assume an adversarial, decentralized, and high-speed environment, then how can the receiving node be 
sure that the path being announced by the incoming packet is the actual path followed by it? In this paper 
we describe the networking primitive, called Routing Path Verification (RPV), which serves as a tool to 
enforce routing policies and presents a solution to the defined core challenge. We assess the security of 
the proposed RPV construction in a formal way. More significantly we augment a suitable key exchange 
protocol with our proposed RPV construction, to achieve an overall RPV scheme. We also evaluate the 
computational, communication and storage overhead of our proposed scheme and the experimental results 
show that the approach is quite scalable. 
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1 Introduction & Background 
 
Designing secure protocols for Wireless Sensor 
Networks (WSNs) presents unique challenges due 
to lack of characteristics such as pre-deployed in-
frastructure (PKI / CA) and centralized policy and 
control. In addition, if the sensor nodes are not 
static, then the ever changing network topology 
due to the mobility of the nodes and the limits on 
the communication and computational capabilities 
of individual nodes present new challenges in de-
veloping efficient and secure networking protocols. 
Routing in WSNs enables packet delivery from 
one node to another by way of intermediate nodes. 
It is the fundamental issue considered in WSNs, 
thus secure routing (Shokrzade et al., 2015) is a 
fundamental issue in WSN security. Taking into 
consideration both changing topology as well as 
changing membership, in addition to route estab-
lishment or discovery, routing protocols for WSNs 
need to incorporate ‘‘route maintenance’’, in order 
to provide for the broken routes in case of member 
node in the route moving out of the range or oth-
erwise in case of avoidance of malicious nodes. 
This renders route maintenance quintessential for 
sensor network paradigm. The wireless medium as 
well as non-infrastructure nature of the sensor 
networks makes them increasingly vulnerable to a 
number of attacks on the underlying routing pro-
tocol (Ballav and Rana, 2015). Unlike wired net-
works where the attacker needs to gain access to 
the physical medium to launch any kind of attack, 
in case of wireless networking, an intruder can 
easily gain access to the on-going traffic. As there 
is not any centralized infrastructure, it is very dif-
ficult to have a key distribution center or a trusted 
certification authority to provide cryptographic 
keys and digital certificates to help nodes authen-
ticate themselves. Secure routing aims to ensure 
correct and successful routing among authentic 
nodes with adversary nodes existing around or in-
side the network. One of the tools which supple-
ment this aim of achieving secure routing in 
WSNs is Routing Path Verification (RPV). 
 
1.1 Routing Path Verification 
 
RPV means that the destination node in a putative 
routing path, agrees on the exact sequence (order) 
of nodes traversed in that path. For example, if the 
packet received at the destination announces that it 
has traversed nodes S, B, C and E (in that order); 
then the destination node should be able to verify 
that what is being announced is true.  
 
1.1.1 Secure RPV 
 
We say that a RPV scheme is secure if, given an 
announced path; the destination node can effi-
ciently verify (both) the presence and sequence of 
each node that appears in the announced path. 
Please note that the above definition implies 
that an honest node cannot appear in the routing 
path unless it actually took part in routing process 
of the packet that led to that path. Figure 1 below 
illustrates the conceptual gist of RPV.  
 
Figure 1  If a packet actually travels from node S to D via 
path “a” and there exists at least one honest node 
on path “a”, then node D should be able to detect 
if the arriving packet announces any other path 
“b” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To further elaborate the RPV mechanism un-
derway in Figure 1, let’s suppose that the packet in 
reality traversed from S to D using the path 
S→B→C→E→D. It is natural to assume that the 
source and destination nodes i.e. S and D respec-
tively are honest. Now, what we want to empha-
size here is that if some arbitrary path (other than 
the path S→B→C→E→D) is being announced to 
the node D and if there exists at least one honest 
node in announced path, using the RPV mecha-
nism the destination node (D in this case) should 
be able to verify that the path being announced is 
not the one which the packet in reality traversed.  
 
1.1.2 Limitations of RPV 
 
We would like to remark here that there are sever-
al functions that RPV cannot handle solely by it-
self because either they are seemingly infeasible or 
they fall outside the scope of path verification. For 
example, a malicious node existing on the path can 
forward the received packet anywhere; either de-
fying the enforced routing path or acting against 
the default routing policy. Such kind of misbehav-
ior seems hard to be handled. The packet can also 
pass via some hidden nodes like wormholes, 
which do not alter it at all and simply forward it 
without any change. This also seems hard to be 
prevented.  
 
1.1.3 RPV as a Routing Policy Tool 
 
What we try to emphasize here is that purpose of 
RPV is not to provide a solution to the problems 
mentioned in Section 1.1.2, but to provide an as-
surance to the destination of the avoidance of ma-
licious nodes (wormholes, sinkholes, etc) / 
un-trusted paths through the use of geographical 
routing as suggested by Shokrzade et al. (2015). A 
sufficiently secure routing protocol has some pro-
visions to detect misbehaving nodes working in 
collusion with each other. Once such misbehaving 
nodes are detected, their misbehavior should be 
reported to all other legitimate nodes in the net-
work. So that other nodes, that have routes con-
taining these malicious nodes, can revoke these 
routes and use alternate routes. RPV would enable 
a node to ensure the compliance of avoiding these 
bad nodes. In the overall security architecture, we 
can think of RPV serving as a routing policy en-
forcing tool after the trust analysis of the network 
or alternatively as a routing forensic tool to vali-
date the announced route to a destination.  
 
1.2 Other RPV Schemes in Literature 
 
There are a number of schemes in literature which 
try to achieve the aim of RPV in networks. The 
first path validation proposal was from Naous et al. 
(2011) which was later improved upon by Kim et 
al. (2014). However, these proposals require PKI 
and are not suitable for WSN scenario. Another 
scheme was proposed by Jiang et al. (2013). 
However, this scheme is not suited for resource 
limited WSNs as it was mainly designed for in-
ter-domain routing path verification using BGP 
protocol in internet and is dependent upon the un-
derlying network infrastructure. Very recently, an-
other scheme has been proposed by Karumanchi et 
al. (2016) which attempts at path verification in 
unstructured peer-to-peer networks (which is the 
case of WSNs). However, the validation in this 
scheme is limited only to the resource discovery 
phase of the paths taken by search queries, while 
the requirement in our case is that the RPV 
scheme needs to be spontaneous and independent 
of the underlying routing protocol and network 
infrastructure.    
To the best of our knowledge, as of now, RPV 
schemes in WSNs which are instantaneous and 
independent of underlying network protocols is 
proposed through the use of ID based sequential 
aggregate signature schemes (IBSAS). An aggre-
gate signature is a digital signature that supports 
aggregation: given n signatures on n distinct mes-
sages by n distinct users using an aggregate signa-
ture algorithm, it is possible to aggregate these 
signatures into a single short signature. This single 
signature (and the n original messages) will con-
vince the verifier that the n users did indeed sign 
the n original messages. However, in a sequential 
aggregate signature, aggregation can only be done 
during the signing process. Each signer in turn 
sequentially adds her signature to the current ag-
gregate. Thus, there is an explicit order imposed 
on the aggregate signature and the signers must 
communicate with each other during the aggrega-
tion process.  
ID based aggregate signature (IBAS) 
schemes were introduced by Gentry and Ramzan 
(2006). The security of their scheme relies on the 
hardness of Gap Diffe-Hellman problem in a 
Random Oracle Model (ROM). Based upon their 
primary work, improved IBSAS schemes 
(Boldyreva et al., 2007; 2010) were presented later. 
While these schemes offer the fundamental ad-
vantage of universal verification by anyone in the 
network and avoid the use of PKIs / CAs by em-
ploying Identity based Cryptography (IBC), they 
suffer from the computationally heavy bilinear 
pairings based operations. This particular aspect 
obstruct their widespread deployment in the re-
source constrained WSN routing protocols. On the 
other hand, Bagherzandi and Jarecki (2010) have 
proposed an IBAS scheme which avoids the usual 
bilinear pairings but is unsuitable for RPV accom-
plishment essentially because of being a 
“non-sequential” scheme and furthermore because 
of the requirement of two rounds of communica-
tion. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 enlists the details of our RPV scheme. 
Section 3 presents the security analysis, Section 4 
presents the performance analysis of the proposed 
scheme and Section 5 details the Header Extension 
to be used in conjunction with the proposed RPV 
scheme.  
 
2 Routing Path Verification Scheme 
 
In this section we will present the details of our 
RPV scheme which consists of two major parts. 
The first part is an on demand Identity based Au-
thenticated Key Exchange (IDAKE) protocol 
which ultimately shares a symmetric secret key 
between two nodes separated by multi-hops. The 
second part of this scheme is an RPV construction 
based upon Message Authentication Code (MAC). 
 
2.1 On Demand Key Exchange 
 
Whenever a need for having a shared secret key 
between any node on the path and the destination 
node arises, an IDAKE protocol is executed be-
tween the two nodes. One such IDAKE protocol 
which happens to be non-interactive was suggest-
ed by Sakai et al. (2000). However, this protocol, 
though non interactive, is not well suited for our 
scenario as it involves the computation of expen-
sive bilinear pairings (Galbraith, S. D., 2005) and 
would eventually introduce excessive delay (due 
to computational limitations) in the delivery of the 
packet in question. The IDAKE protocol (Yasmin 
et al., 2014) which we use in conjunction with our 
RPV construction is a pairing free one pass proto-
col which is more suited to resource constrained 
WSNs because of its less communication over-
head than other multi pass IDAKE protocols. The 
important aspect of this protocol is that it avoids 
the usual pairing operations required in most of 
the previous published IDAKE schemes (McCul-
lagh and Barreto, 2005; Shim, 2003; Smart, 2002). 
To the best of our knowledge, it is the only one 
pass IDAKE protocol which is also pairing free. 
For the continuity of discussion, we only present a 
brief overview of the IDAKE protocol in this pa-
per. For further details of the protocol please refer 
to Yasmin et al. (2014). 
Initial Parameters & Key Generation. As this key 
exchange protocol is essentially ID based, the 
PKG generates the system parameters as follows:- 
 
(a) Specifies q, p, E/Fp, P and G where q is a large 
prime number and p is the ﬁeld size, E/Fp is an el-
liptic curve E over a ﬁnite ﬁeld Fp, P is a base 
point of order q on the curve E and G is an addi-
tive cyclic group of order q generated by P.  
 
(b) Chooses a random s ∈ Zq* as the master secret 
key and then computes PPKG = sP as the master 
public key.  
 
(c) Chooses a suitable hash function H: {0,1}* × 
G → Zq*.   
 
Next the PKG computes the private key of 
each node corresponding to its ID using the 
Schnorr signature scheme. For a node Y with iden-
tity IDy, the private key is calculated as follows: 
 
(a) For a randomly chosen ry ∈ Zq*, PKG computes 
Ry = ryP and cy = H (IDy,Ry).  
 
(b) Then it computes the private key as sy = cys+ry.  
 
(c) Finally, outputs (sy, Ry) where sy is secret key 
and Ry is public key. 
 
Note: Before deployment, every node Y stores its 
identity IDy, private key sy, public key Ry and 
public system parameters {q, p, E/Fp,P,G,PPKG,H} 
in its memory. 
 
The One Pass Protocol. The following steps de-
scribe the one pass IDAKE protocol, whenever a 
node Z wants to communicate with another node 
Y: 
 
(a) Node Z chooses a random t ∈ Zq* as ephemeral 
key and computes y = tsz and then the point L = yP 
on the elliptic curve E. Node Z then signs the 
ephemeral public key L together with IDz, IDy and 
timestamp TS with any suitable ID based signature 
scheme and sends 
[L,IDz,IDy,TS,Sigsz(L,IDz,IDy,TS)] to the node Y.  
 
(b) The node Y checks the time stamp TS to avoid 
a replayed message. If the message is a fresh one, 
Y veriﬁes the signature Sigsz(L,IDz,IDy,TS). After 
successful signature verification node Y computes 
the shared secret Ky,z = syL (= sytszP) and deletes 
L.  
 
(c) Then node Z first computes Sy = cyPPKG +Ry. 
Then the shared secret Kz,y = ySy (= tszsyP). It then 
deletes L, t and y.  
 
Both parties then compute the shared session key 
using a suitable key derivation function. 
 
2.2 The RPV Construction 
 
For our RPV construction, which represents the 
core of our scheme, we investigate the crypto-
graphic construction of aggregate MACs (Katz 
and Lindell, 2008). Aggregate MACs have the 
property that multiple MAC tags, computed (pos-
sibly) by various senders on various (possibly dif-
ferent) messages, can be aggregated into a shorter 
tag that can still be verified by a recipient who 
shares a distinct key with each sender. Informally, 
aggregate MACs can be thought of as the sym-
metric key analogue of aggregate signatures. The 
complexity of this aggregate MAC scheme is es-
sentially the same as of a regular MAC scheme. 
However, the construction is not suitable for our 
application scenario as it does not protect against 
“remixing” the order of participating entities as 
explained by Eikemeier et al. (2010). The basic 
reason for such attacks is that the scheme of Katz 
and Lindell (2008) supports the aggregation of 
MACs independent of the order of the participat-
ing parties, meaning that the aggregation algo-
rithm is an un-keyed process. 
As verifying the order of participating parties 
(nodes) is very essential in our scenario, in this 
paper we will present an aggregate MAC based 
RPV construction which would be able to verify 
the order of the participating nodes and essentially 
would offer the same complexity as that of the 
scheme of Katz and Lindell (2008). As MACs 
constitutes the core of our construction, we pro-
ceed ahead by defining them formally below and 
then presenting our construction:- 
 
Definition 1 (MAC). We define ‘MAC’ = (Mac, 
Vrfy) over key, message and tag space K, M, T ϵ 
[0 1]n  respectively as a pair of polynomial time 
algorithms, where: 
Algorithm Mac: The signing algorithm Mac(k,m) 
takes its input a message ‘m’ in M and a shared 
key ‘k’ in K and outputs a tag ‘t’ in T. 
Algorithm Vrfy: The verification algorithm 
Vrfy(k,m,t) outputs a `yes’ or `no’ by taking inputs 
as a message ‘m’, a key ‘k’ and a tag ‘t’ and al-
ways holds the correctness condition Vrfy{k,m, 
Mac(k,m)} = ‘yes’. 
 Construction 1 (RPV). Let Mac be a deterministic 
algorithm. We define ‘RPV’ = (Mac*, Agg*, 
Vrfy*) as a tuple of following polynomial time 
algorithms: 
Algorithm Mac*: Upon input k ϵ [0 1]n and m ϵ [0 
1]n outputs Mac(k,m). 
Algorithm Agg*: Upon input a tag ti-1 ϵ [0 1]n and 
a key ki ϵ [0 1]n the algorithm Agg*(ti-1, ki) outputs 
a new tag, ti = Mac*(ki, idi+1)
1⊕ Mac*(ki, ti-1). 
(For ti-1 = Ø, simply execute the Mac* algorithm 
on initial input message m).  
Algorithm Vrfy*: Upon input an ordered set of 
keys k1; …. ; kx ϵ [0 1]n, tag t ϵ [0 1]n and an input 
message m ϵ [0 1]n, algorithm Vrfy*{(k1;….; 
kx),m,t} computes for i = 1,…., x,  t’ ← Agg*(ti-1, 
ki), with t0 = Ø and outputs 1 if t’ = t otherwise 0. 
The algorithm also returns 0 if any key identifier 
in the ordered input key set is repeated. 
 
The construction elaborated above has following 
“chaining” structure: 
 
Mac*(k2,Mac*(k1,m) ⊕ Mac*(k1,id2)) ⊕ 
Mac*(k2,id3)   ⊕ ….. ⊕ 
Mac*(kx,….(Mac*(k2,Mac*(k1,m) ⊕ 
Mac*(k1,id2)))) ⊕ Mac*(kx,iddest) 
 
It is easy to verify the correctness of above con-
struction.  
 
2.2.1 MACs from PRFs 
 
The reader maybe wondering that in Definition 1 
above, the message space, key space and tag space 
seems to be same (‘n’ in our case). The reason for 
this would become clear as we further explain this 
section. Due to the design requirements of our 
RPV scheme, we avoid MAC constructions which 
are based upon other primitives like collision re-
sistant hash functions, for example HMAC 
(Krawczyk et al., 1997), primarily because of the 
fact that in our RPV scheme we require the under-
lying MAC function to be a Pseudo Random Per-
mutation (PRP) introduced by Luby and Rackoﬀ 
(1988). This property of being a PRP is required in 
formal proof of security of the proposed RPV 
                                                        
1 idi+1 here represents the n-bit value of the identifier of the 
next hop node in the current route and isn’t an explicit input 
to the Agg* algorithm. The value is derived implicitly from 
the current routing table of the node. 
scheme and would become clear once the reader 
would approach Section 3. The secondary reason 
of not using keyed hash functions based MACs in 
our scheme is because of their well-known weak-
ness with respect to generic birthday attack (Joux, 
2004) which imposes tight security bounds on 
their usage with the same secret key ‘k’. However, 
we would like to mention here that this limitation 
can be easily overcome by using appropriate hash 
functions like SHA-2 which offer more flexible 
security bounds. Instead, the MACs to be used in 
our scheme are the ones build directly from Pseu-
do Random Functions (PRFs) (Goldreich et al., 
1986). In Section 4, performance comparison be-
tween the two approaches has been detailed for 
ease of understanding of the reader. We also take 
care of messages of arbitrary length by fixing the 
initial input message size (which actually is a 
nonce) to ‘n’ bits. We formally define these types 
of MACs as follows: 
 
Definition 2 (PRF based MACs). For a PRF F: K × 
X ⟶ Y where K, X ,Y ϵ [0 1]n, we define a MAC 
IPRF = (Mac,Vrfy) as:  
 
(a)  Mac(k,m) := t ← F(k,m) 
 
(b)  Vrfy(k,m,t): output `yes’ if  t = F(k,m) and 
`no’ otherwise.  
 
For our case, we use the 128 bit key length version 
of AES block cipher as a PRF whose domain, 
range and key space are all same as 128 bits. 
There are two main reasons for choosing AES. 
First it fits well into our design criterion because 
of its smaller key and tag size (i.e. 128 bits) but 
which is still large enough for brute force security. 
Secondly, because it is not only a PRF but also a 
Pseudo Random Permutation (PRP) and this prop-
erty will help us in the formal proof of security of 
our RPV construction in Section 3. A PRP is de-
fined as follows: 
 
Definition 3 (PRPs). A PRP E: K × X → X is de-
fined over key and message space (K,X) such that: 
 
(a)  There exists an “efficient” algorithm to eval-
uate E(k,x) for all k ϵ K and x ϵ X. 
 
(b)  The function E(k, . ) is one-to-one. 
 
(c)  There exists an “efficient” inversion algo-
rithm D(k,x) for all k ϵ K and x ϵ X. 
 
2.2.2 The RPV Scheme Explained 
 
The basis of our path verification construction is 
“chaining” mechanism. The source node selects a 
nonce and then generates tag t1 by using its shared 
secret key with destination node. After calculation 
of the tag, the source node encrypts this nonce 
with its shared key with the destination node and 
appends this encrypted nonce along with the tag to 
the rest of the packet. However, here we stress that 
we assume that the integrity of this encrypted 
nonce is ensured end-to-end till the destination 
node along with any other packet content (that al-
so needs to be verified for end-to-end integrity) of 
the underlying layers. This is usually the case be-
tween two communicating end nodes and can be 
very efficiently realized through MACs. Further-
more, if any authentication / integrity mechanism 
is already in use between the neighboring nodes 
on the path, then the appropriate steps are execut-
ed; however we do not pre-require any such 
mechanism for our RPV construction.  
Once the packet arrives at the node 2, it 
checks its memory state for a shared key ‘k2’ with 
the destination node and if cannot find one; initi-
ates the one pass IDAKE protocol. It then calcu-
lates the new tag t2 by first getting Mac (k2,t1) and 
then by taking an XOR of it with Mac (k2,id3), 
where id3 is the identity of the next node (node 3) 
on the path. More formally, the aggregation algo-
rithm of Construction 1 above describes this very 
step. The process is repeated till the packet arrives 
at the destination node. Basically, the only part of 
the packet (from RPV viewpoint) that changes its 
values for every hop is the tag field and the “path 
field” as they both keep on getting updated for 
every hop, while the rest of the packet stays un-
changed. In this paper for the sake of simplicity 
and clarity, we assume that the “path field” is al-
ready part of the underlying routing protocol and 
no exclusive measure needs to be taken to cater for 
this requirement. 
After the packet arrives at the destination 
node and announces the purported path via “path 
field”; the destination nodes decrypts the nonce 
and verifies the tag received as in the verification 
algorithm of Construction 1. For the nodes on the 
announced path which do not have a shared key 
with the destination node; new key is established 
by completing the already initiated one pass ID-
AKE protocol by these nodes. The contents of the 
one pass IDAKE protocol(s) (if any) travel along 
with the packet. Figure 2 below provides an over-
view of the process. 
 
Figure 2  The RPV “Chaining” Mechanism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Security Analysis 
 
3.1 The Attack Model 
 
As usually is the case, the nodes in our system are 
resource constrained in terms of computation ca-
pabilities and available battery power. We assume 
that both the source and the destination (the end 
points) are honest nodes. We use the generic terms 
source and destination to mean, respectively, the 
initiator and the target of the path in consideration. 
We envisage a network where the majority of the 
bulk traffic between the nodes is secured via 
symmetric encryption schemes because of their 
superior computational efficiency over their public 
key based counterparts. Therefore, it seems very 
realistic to assume that those nodes which are in 
the direct radio communication range (one hop 
nodes) of each other already share a secret sym-
metric key. This can easily be accomplished dur-
ing the secure neighbor discovery phase (Khan et 
al., 2015; Poturalski et al., 2013; Taheri et al., 
2016). 
After the initial deployment phase, various 
available routes are established between com-
municating nodes and routing tables as usual are 
kept on being updated according to the underlying 
routing protocol. Whenever, two nodes want to 
communicate securely with each other, a suitable 
ID based key agreement protocol is executed be-
tween the two nodes and a shared secret key is es-
tablished. The choice of using a particular protocol 
depends upon the target application and the re-
quired level of security. Some protocols offer su-
perior security but with higher computational and 
communication requirements while others offer 
vice versa. To reduce the communication over-
heads involved during the symmetric key estab-
lishment phase, the nodes which are in usual 
communication with each other cache the shared 
keys (for a limited time) for future use after the 
termination of the current session. In this way the 
key agreement protocol needs only to be executed 
very occasionally. We believe that this very ap-
proach provides an appropriate compromise be-
tween computational / communication overheads 
and storage requirements. Note that the unique 
private key is the only long term secret that the 
nodes possess. We also assume that the route to be 
taken by an individual packet between the two 
nodes is unknown a priori for every packet.  It 
means that the route can be different for every 
packet even during the same communication ses-
sion.   
It is assumed that source and destination 
nodes already share a secret key using a suitable 
ID based Authenticated Key Exchange (IDAKE) 
protocol (the protocol could be a two pass or even 
three pass). However, it is not assumed that every 
node on the path being verified already has a 
shared secret key with the destination. An over-
view of a pairing free one pass IDAKE scheme to 
be used in conjunction with our RPV construction 
in these scenarios is already presented in Section 
2.1. 
We assume an active adversary who has far 
stronger capabilities than his passive counterpart. 
It can introduce its own packets as well as delete, 
delay and modify packets before forwarding them. 
We focus on protection of our scheme against ac-
tive adversaries. 
 
3.2 Security Properties of IDAKE Protocol 
 
In this section we would very briefly skim through 
the security properties of the one pass pairing-free 
IDAKE protocol (Yasmin et al., 2014).  
 
Implicit Key Authentication: The one-pass proto-
col provides Implicit Key Authentication. The ini-
tiating node is authenticated through the verifica-
tion of the signature scheme while the authentica-
tion of the destination node is assured via the cal-
culation of public parameter Sy = (syP) in Zq*.   
 
Key Confirmation: The IDAKE protocol does not 
provide key confirmation. In fact, no one-pass 
protocol can provide key confirmation. 
 
Known Key Security: Because of the contribution 
of ephemeral value t in calculation of the shared 
secret, the protocol provides Known Key Security. 
 
Sender’s Forward Secrecy: Through the contribu-
tion of ephemeral secret t in the IDAKE protocol, 
sender’s forward secrecy is also assured. 
 
Unknown Key Share: The IDAKE protocol is also 
protected from Unknown Key Share attacks be-
cause of the inclusion of IDs in the calculation of 
the public parameters of the participating nodes. 
 
Key Control: Being a one-pass, this IDAKE pro-
tocol does not protect against Key Control. The 
selection of ephemeral public parameter is made 
only by the initiating node and not the destination 
node. 
 
3.3 Security of MAC 
 
We begin by establishing the security of our un-
derlying MAC, as defined in Definition 1, under 
an adaptive chosen message attack game model 
(Goldwasser et al., 1988). For a MAC   I = 
(Mac,Vrfy) and adversary A, we define a MAC 
chosen message attack game as depicted below in 
Figure 3: 
 
Figure 3  The MAC Attack Game 
 
 
 
The attacker can launch a chosen message attack 
for as many messages m1,m2,…,mq  as he wants 
and is given the corresponding tags ti  Mac(k,mi) 
for his chosen messages by the oracle. These we 
formally call as ‘Mac queries’. The attacker A can 
also submit another type of query which we call as 
‘Corrupt query’, as a result of which he gets to 
know the corresponding secret key k. The attack-
er’s goal here is existential forgery, i.e. produce 
some new message/tag pair (m,t), where (m,t)  
{ (m1,t1) , … , (mq,tq) } and submits it to the chal-
lenger. The challenger returns b, where b=1 if 
Vrfy(k.m,t) = ‘yes’ and (m,t) { (m1,t1) , … , 
(mq,tq) } and no ‘Corrupt query’ was issued; oth-
erwise b=0. 
 
Definition 4 (Secure MAC). We say that I = 
(Mac,Vrfy)  is a secure MAC if for all “efficient” 
adversaries AdvMAC[A,I] = Pr[Chal. outputs 1] is 
“negligible.”, meaning that no “efficient” adver-
sary can win the adaptive chosen message attack 
game with non-negligible probability. 
 
3.4 Security of PRF based MAC  
 
As we use PRF based MACs in our constructions, 
so here we will very briefly establish the security 
of our PRF based MAC construction as in Defini-
tion 2. 
 
Theorem 1. If F: K×X⟶Y is a secure PRF and 
1/|Y| is negligible (i.e. |Y| is large) then IPRF as in 
Definition 2 is also a secure MAC. 
 
In particular, for every efficient MAC adversary A 
attacking IPRF there exists an efficient PRF adver-
sary B attacking F such that AdvMAC[A, IPRF] 
 AdvPRF[B, F] + 1/|Y|. This statement means that 
IPRF is secure as long as |Y| is large, say |Y| = 2
80. 
 
Proof (Sketch): Suppose f: X ⟶ Y is a truly ran-
dom function from message space X to tag space Y. 
Then MAC adversary A must win the following 
game depicted as in Figure 4 below: 
 
Figure 4  The ‘Adaptive Chosen Message Attack’ Game 
 
 
 
Adversary A will win this game if t = f(m) and m 
 {m1 , … , mq} i.e. existential forgery. But as f is 
a truly random function, the previous tags which 
the adversary got from the challenger don’t have 
any influence on his decision of choosing the tag 
for the message m as the value of the function f at 
point m is independent of its value at other points 
and hence the probability with which A will win 
this game is 1/|Y|. However, if we replace f with 
our pseudo random function F the adversary 
would not be able to differentiate between the two 
and would behave the same way as if he is inter-
acting with a truly random function.         □ 
                                                                                    
3.5 RPV Construction Security 
 
The definition of security for our RPV construc-
tion corresponds to existential unforgeability un-
der an adaptive chosen-message attack. To present 
it formally we prove the following theorem: 
 
Theorem 2. If Mac is existentially unforgeable 
under an adaptive chosen-message attack (Defini-
tion 4) and Mac is deterministic, then RPV = 
(Mac*, Agg*, Vrfy*) as given in Construction 1 is 
also secure against existential forgery under an 
adaptive chosen message attack. 
 
Proof: The outline of this proof generally follows 
the approach of Katz and Lindell (2008) but as the 
construction here is essentially different, the re-
ductions used in this proof are also quite different. 
We prove this theorem using the contra-positive 
approach of logic theory. More precisely, we will 
show that if there exists some existentially forgea-
ble (Mac*, Agg*, Vrfy*) RPV construction then 
from this we can build an existentially forgeable 
MAC. We start by fixing a polynomial time RPV 
adversary A but here as we would be dealing with 
numerous numbers of keys, for ease of under-
standing, we would be using identifiers to link a 
particular key with a particular node. We formally 
define adversary A as follows: 
 
Definition 5 (RPV Adversary). Let A be a polyno-
mial time adversary involved in the following ex-
periment: 
Key Generation: Keys k1, …. , kt ϵ [0 1]n  are 
generated corresponding to IDs 1,….,t respective-
ly. 
Queries: Adversary A is allowed following two 
types of queries: 
•  Query Mac: Upon input i and m; the oracle 
will return Mac(ki,m) 
•  Query Corrupt: Upon input i; the oracle will 
return ki 
Outputs: A outputs an ordered set of node IDs 
1;….;s ϵ [1,……,t] (representing a particular path), 
an initial nonce m ϵ [0 1]n  and a tag t ϵ [0 1]n 
(Please note that all node IDs in this ordered set 
need to be distinct).   
Success:  We say that A is successful in the ex-
periment if Vrfy*{(k1;….; ks-1),m,t} =1 and there 
exists at least one node i ϵ [1,….,s-1]  in the an-
nounced path such that: 
•  A never queried Mac(i,ti-1)2 
•  A never queried Corrupt(i) 
We also fix a MAC adversary F which will inter-
act with a challenger (with a secret key k*) and 
would try to produce a valid existential forgery as 
illustrated in Section 3.3 by using the adversary A 
in its “belly”. F proceeds as follows: 
 
(a) It chooses a random ID i* ← {1,…..,t}. 
 
(b)  For i = 1 to t: 
 
      (i) If i ≠i*, it chooses ki ← {0,1}n. 
(ii) If i = i*, F does nothing (however, it 
implicitly sets ki* = k*). 
 
(c)  Then F “runs” A, answering its queries as 
given below: 
 
Query Mac(I , m): If i ≠ i* then F answers the 
query using the self generated key ki. If i = i* then 
F queries its own MAC challenger and returns 
Mac*(k*,m) as the result. 
Query Corrupt(i): If i ≠ i* then  F gives A the self 
generated key ki. If i = i* then we abort the game. 
 
(d)  After completion of its query phase, A out-
puts a forgery to F  by providing it with an or-
dered set of node IDs 1;….;s ϵ [1,……,t], initial 
nonce m ϵ [0 1]n and a tag t ϵ  [0 1]n. Let j ϵ 
[1,….,s-1]  be an index in the ordered key set 
such that: 
•  A never queried Corrupt(j)  
•  A never queried Mac(j ,tj-1)3                                                   
 
If j ≠ i*, then we abort the game; otherwise we 
proceed to step (e). 
 
(e)  As j = i* {from step (d)}, F calculates the tag 
                                                        
2 Here ti-1 denotes the value of the tag that should be 
outputted by the previous node on the announced path, 
if the initial nonce used is ‘m’. 
3 The verification of this condition is actually realized 
in step (e). 
tj-1 as follows: 
 
For i = 1,…., j-1,  tj-1 ← Agg*(ti-1, ki) 
 
Adversary F then calculates the tag tj as follows: 
 
For i = s,…., j+2,  tj ← Dec[ki-1,(ti-1⊕  
Mac(ki-1, idi))] 
 
Here ‘Dec’ means the AES decipher function. As 
our MAC construction is essentially the AES ci-
pher, we can always apply the corresponding de-
cipher function, as AES is a PRP (see Definition 3). 
In the above calculations F uses those values for 
keys k1, …., kj-1, kj+1,…, ks-1 which it had already 
chosen in step {b (i)}. Finally, F calculates t* = tj 
⊕ Mac(k*, idj+1) by the querying his MAC chal-
lenger and outputs (tj-1, t*) as an existential forgery 
to the Mac challenger. 
 
If we assume that F doesn’t abort in the above 
game then the following of the proof becomes ev-
ident and unambiguous. In case adversary A is 
successful in outputting a valid existential forgery 
against the RPV construction then it means F also 
outputs a valid existential forgery against the un-
derlying MAC scheme. To see this note that when 
adversary A succeeds it essentially means that 
Vrfy*{(k1;….; ks-1),m,t} =1 because the underly-
ing Mac function is deterministic and the output 
values are well defined. Hence, the calculations 
involved in step (e) above would lead to distinct 
and well defined values of tj-1 and t*. Moreover, 
adversary F never queried, directly or indirectly, 
its own MAC challenger for the input tj-1 and still 
was able to produce a valid output tag. This com-
pletes the proof.  □ 
 
Please note that to provide an additional layer of 
security in our construction; the initial nonce is 
encrypted by the shared key between the source 
and the destination nodes. However, in our securi-
ty analysis above, we gave adversary the addition-
al capability to choose arbitrary nonce(s) of his 
own choice to break the scheme. 
 
4 Performance Analysis 
 
In this section we will analyze the performance of 
our scheme with regards to computation, commu-
nication and delay overhead. The tool which we 
have used for calculation of our results is OPNET 
Modeler 14.5. C programming language code has 
been used for implementation of underlying cryp-
tographic primitives. The results have been com-
piled for networks comprising of 5, 20 and 50 
nodes. Figures 5, 6 and 7 below depict the screen-
shots of the OPNET simulation. 
 
Figure 5  OPNET Simulation of 5 Wireless Nodes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6  OPNET Simulation of 20 Wireless Nodes 
 
 
 
Figure 7  OPNET Simulation of 50 Wireless Nodes 
 
 
 
The ensuing sub-sections would detail the 
performance results of the proposed RPV scheme 
with respect to computation, communication and 
delay overhead. Results have been compiled for 
both symmetric encryption (AES-128) based RPV 
scheme and keyed hash function (SHA-256) based 
RPV scheme. From a security viewpoint, both ap-
proaches provide same level of security (128 bit). 
Figure 8 till 16 below presents the details of the 
experimental results for various configurations. 
 
Figure 8 Simulation Results for 05 Nodes without RPV 
 
 
Figure 9 Simulation Results for 05 Nodes with AES based 
RPV 
 
 
  
Figure 10 Simulation Results for 05 Nodes with SHA based 
RPV 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 Simulation Results for 20 Nodes without RPV 
 
 
 
Figure 12 Simulation Results for 20 Nodes with AES based 
RPV 
 
Figure 13 Simulation Results for 20 Nodes with SHA based 
RPV 
 
 
 
Figure 14 Simulation Results for 50 Nodes without RPV 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 Simulation Results for 50 Nodes with AES based 
RPV 
 
 
 
Figure 16 Simulation Results for 50 Nodes with SHA based 
RPV 
 
 
 
4.1 Computational Overhead 
 
In this sub-section, we present the average CPU 
utilization of all nodes from various OPNET sim-
ulation configurations. The results have been 
compiled for the scenarios when RPV is not active, 
when AES based RPV is active and when SHA 
based RPV is active. Table 1 presents the summary 
of these computational results.  
 
Table 1  Computational Overhead Comparison 
No of 
Nodes 
Without 
RPV 
AES based 
RPV 
SHA based 
RPV 
05 0.12 % 0.20 % 0.14% 
 
20 
 
0.20 % 
 
0.28% 
 
0.26% 
 
 
50 
 
 
0.24% 
 
 
0.50% 
 
 
0.37% 
 
From the experimental results, it is evident 
that with the RPV scheme in place, CPU utiliza-
tion increases as expected, however, still remains 
within acceptable limits. Also evident from the 
experimental results is that computational over-
head between symmetric encryption (AES) based 
RPV scheme and keyed hash function (SHA-256) 
based RPV scheme is better in case of keyed hash 
functions based RPV with same level of security. 
The same fact is also supported by (Crypto++ 
5.6.0 Benchmarks).  
 
4.2 Communication Overhead 
 
In this sub-section, we will analyze the overall 
network throughput from various OPNET simula-
tion configurations. The results have been com-
piled for the scenarios when RPV is not active, 
when AES based RPV is active and when SHA 
based RPV is active. Figure 8 till 16 presents the 
simulation results for these configurations. Table 2 
below presents the summary of these communica-
tion overhead results.  
 
Table 2  Communication Overhead Comparison 
No of 
Nodes 
Without 
RPV 
AES based 
RPV 
SHA based 
RPV 
05 2.20 Mbps 2.35 Mbps 2.40 mbps 
 
20 
 
2.70 Mbps 
 
2.75 Mbps 
 
2.80 Mbps 
 
 
50 
 
 
6.90 Mbps 
 
 
7.05 Mbps 
 
 
7.5 Mbps 
 
From the experimental results, it is evident 
that with the RPV scheme in place, the communi-
cation overhead is well within acceptable limits. 
Also evident from the experimental results is that 
communication overhead between symmetric en-
cryption (AES) based RPV scheme and keyed 
hash function (SHA-256) based RPV scheme is 
comparable and slightly in favour of AES based 
RPV approach. The reason for this is the fact that 
to achieve same level of security, SHA based RPV 
scheme has to produce tags of double the size of 
those of AES based RPV scheme. 
 
4.3 Delay Overhead 
 
In this sub-section, we will analyze the average 
time delay from various OPNET simulation con-
figurations. The results have been compiled for the 
scenarios when RPV is not active, when AES 
based RPV is active and when SHA based RPV is 
active. Figure 8 till 16 presents the simulation re-
sults for these configurations. Table 3 presents the 
summary of these time delay based results.  
 
 
Table 3  Time Delay Comparison 
No of 
Nodes 
Without 
RPV 
AES based 
RPV 
SHA based 
RPV 
05 0.16 secs 0.22 secs 0.21 secs 
 
20 
 
3.00 secs 
 
3.10 secs 
 
3.05 secs 
 
 
50 
 
 
9.00 secs 
 
 
9.10 secs 
 
 
9.05 secs 
 
From the experimental results above, it is ev-
ident that with the RPV scheme in place, the effect 
on end-to-end delay overhead is negligible and is 
well within acceptable limits. Also evident from 
the experimental results is that time delay over-
head between symmetric encryption (AES) based 
RPV scheme and keyed hash function (SHA-256) 
based RPV scheme is comparable through slightly 
in favour of SHA based RPV. 
 
5 Header Extension & Routing Control 
 
In this section we will present the format of the 
header extension for our RPV scheme. This ex-
tended header has been designed is to be used in 
conjunction with the headers of the underlying 
layers’ protocols to enable our proposed RPV 
scheme to accomplish its role as an effective rout-
ing policy enforcing tool. We also present some 
optional routing control features which can be 
employed with our scheme to give additional 
functionality. The header extension is detailed in 
Figure 5 below: 
 
Figure 5  The RPV Header Extension 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The fields in brown color indicate that they 
already form part of lower layer protocols alt-
hough some of these fields like the Source Address, 
Destination Address, Path Field, etc (all of them 
are from the network layer) are also used in our 
RPV scheme. The RPV header extension consists 
of five fields which are explained in detail next. 
 
Control Bits: This four bit field is always present 
whether RPV scheme is active or not. The contents 
of this field specify the configuration / mode of the 
RPV scheme and indicate the content type of rest 
of the fields. The details are listed as in Table 4 
below: 
 
Table 4  Details of the “Control Bit” Field 
Field  
Value 
Explanation 
0000 
RPV scheme is not in use and normal routing 
should be carried out. The other RPV extension 
header fields are not present. 
 
0001 
 
Indicates a request for RPV initiation by the 
destination node to the source node without any 
route specification. The underlying routing pro-
tocol would decide the route of each packet. No 
other additional RPV fields are present. 
 
 
0010 
 
A request for RPV initiation by the destination 
node to the source node with route specification. 
The path field contents indicate the specific 
route. No other fields are present. 
 
0011 
 
A request for RPV initiation by the destination 
node to the source node with the authority of 
route specification delegated to the source node 
by the destination. No additional fields are pre-
sent. 
 
0100 
 
An RPV termination message from the source 
node. 
0101 
 
An RPV termination confirmation from the des-
tination node in response to message type of 
0100. 
 
0110 
 
An RPV termination request from the source 
node. 
 
0111 
 
An RPV termination confirmation message from 
the source node in response to message type of 
0110. 
 
1000 
 
An RPV response to RPV request of type 0001. 
 
1001 
 
An RPV response to RPV request of type 0010. 
 
1010 
 
An RPV response to RPV request of type 0011. 
 
1011 
 
A self-initiated RPV by source node with route 
specification by the source node itself.  
 
1100 
 
A self-initiated RPV by source node without 
route specification. The underlying routing pro-
tocol decides the route on the go. 
 
1101-1111 
 
Future growth. 
 
As obvious from the above table, this control 
field enables the source and destination nodes with 
additional capabilities to not only express their 
routing policies, but with help of our proposed 
RPV scheme; they are also able to enforce these 
routing policy directives. Moreover, this field ena-
bles our RPV scheme to work in both situations i.e. 
in a pre-specified path or a priori unknown path. 
Another important aspect of this field specification 
is it’s reading overhead on the nodes present on 
the path being followed by the packet. The nodes 
present between the source and destination only 
need to act if the RPV scheme is active i.e. type 
1000 till 1100; otherwise they just need to forward 
this packet without taking any action. To accom-
plish this task efficiently we have designed this 
field as such that the reading time of the nodes on 
the path can be reduced significantly. The nodes 
just need to read the first bit of this field to see 
whether they have to take some action or not. If 
the first bit is 0; they just need to forward it with-
out any changes. On the other hand, if it is 1, then 
they need to update the tag and if required also 
update the other fields like Path, KE, IDAKE 
Contents, etc. Obviously, along with the nonce 
field, the integrity of this control bit field also 
needs to be ensured. 
 
Nonce: The length of this field is 128 bits and it 
stores the encrypted value of the initial nonce be-
ing selected by the source node. Along with the 
“Control Bits” field, the integrity of this field also 
needs to be ensured between the source and the 
destination nodes. 
 
Tag: This 128 bit field is used to store the updated 
value of the tag being produced by every node on 
the path being followed by the packet. 
 
KE: This single bit on-off type field KE (short for 
Key Exchange) is used to indicate whether the 
next field “IDAKE Contents” is present or not. If 
the value of this field is 0 it means that no node on 
the path has initiated the IDAKE protocol. If it is 1, 
then at least one node on the path in question has 
initiated the IDAKE protocol and the “IDAKE 
Contents” field is present. 
 
IDAKE Contents: This field contains the contents 
of the one-pass IDAKE protocol. Moreover, it also 
caters for the total number of nodes and their se-
quence in the said field. 
 
6 Conclusion  
 
In this paper, we presented a RPV scheme suitable 
for resource constrained WSNs. The verification 
provided by our scheme is of all-or-nothing nature 
meaning that even if just one of the participating 
nodes provided invalid authentication tag, the 
whole route is considered invalid. Same is the case 
with the schemes based upon ID based aggregate 
signatures. While the piecemeal verification of the 
route segments can help one identify misbehaving 
/ compromised nodes that produce invalid tags, 
however, it may be noted that such capability 
would come at a cost of enhanced communication 
and computation costs.  
Our scheme provides a promising approach 
towards achieving path verification in resource 
constrained networks. In a way, we can think of 
our scheme as one, which tries to distribute the 
overhead cost to all three aspects of computation, 
communication and storage instead of overloading 
just one or at most two out of them. This particular 
aspect of our scheme along with the feature that 
our scheme assures path verification in even those 
scenarios where the route of the packet is not pre-
determined enables it to be a strong contender for 
deployment in WSNs as an RPV tool. Moreover, 
we also established the security of our scheme in 
formal way in Random Oracle Model (ROM) with 
the security dependent upon the underlying Mes-
sage Authentication Code (MAC) scheme. We also 
provided an explanation of the associated control 
message headers and their use as a routing policy 
enforcing tool. 
 For the future, the authors suggest that the 
research community should explore and build up-
on the suggested 4-bit control field in RPV header 
extension (Section 5) to express routing policies 
and their subsequent enforcement through the use 
of RPV. Specifically, there is a need to standardize 
these control bit fields in combination with some 
suitable underlying WSN routing protocol for true 
utilization of their efficacy and viability. Moreover, 
there is a need to explore for more routing controls 
that can be assigned to the control bit field fields 
left for future growth. 
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